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Abstract
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the major determinants of GDP
growth in South Korea emphasizing the importance of investment, trade and human
capital, using quarterly time series data covering the period 1980Q1 to 2005Q3. The
time series properties of the data are, first, analyzed using the Zivot-Andrews (1992)
model. The empirical results derived indicate that there is insufficient evidence
against the null hypothesis of unit roots for all of the variables under investigation.
Second, the Gregory-Hansen (1996) cointegration technique, allowing for the
presence of potential structural breaks in the data, is applied, and is found to reject the
null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship in favour of the existence of at least
one cointegration relation in the presence of single structural breaks in the system. By
applying these methodologies we find that most of the endogenously determined
structural breaks coincide with the gradual effects of the Asian crisis on the Korean
economy.
Taking into account the resulting endogenously determined structural breaks the error
correction version of the ARDL procedure is then employed, to specify the short- and
long-term determinants of economic growth in the presence of structural breaks.
Based on the preliminary empirical findings obtained we conclude that, in the longterm, policies aimed at promoting various types of physical and human capital, and
trade openness, have improved Korea’s economic growth.
More specifically, the empirical results show that while the effects of physical and
human capital as well as exports are highly significant, as expected, total imports were
found to be non significant, and this could be due to compositional changes away
from the importation of capital goods to consumer goods as Korean standards of
living have improved. It was also found that the speed of adjustment in the estimated
models is relatively high and had the expected significant and negative sign.
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1.

Introduction

The economic growth and transformation of the Korean economy from 1962 to the
present has been truly remarkable (see, for example, Harvie and Lee, 2003a and
2003b; Song, 1990). From being a poverty stricken and economically backward
country in 1962 with a GDP per capita of only US$82, by 2005 this exceeded
US$16,000 and the country had become the fourth largest economy in Asia (after
China, Japan and India on a PPP basis) and the twelfth largest in the world (again on a
PPP basis) (see Wikipedia, 2005). Export driven growth provided the basis for this
rapid and sustained period of economic growth, such that by 2005 Korea had become
the world’s eleventh largest exporting nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006) and
thirteenth largest importing nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). The country
had, therefore, achieved an impressive record of growth and integration into the high
tech global economy.
The economy has, however, experienced periods of economic turbulence: the heavy
and chemical industries (HCI) drive of the early 1970s, the economic and political
turmoil arising from the assassination of President Park in 1979, the export driven
rapid expansion of the economy in the late 1980s, the growth slowdown in 1992-93
from a stabilization policy aimed at reducing inflationary pressure, the collapse of the
exchange rate in late 1997 that exposed long standing weaknesses in the country’s
development model, the subsequent severe economic slowdown in 1998, the ‘tech
wreck’ of 2001 arising from slowing world demand for IT related products upon
which the economy is heavily dependent for export growth, the credit card bubble of
2002 and 2003 and the subsequent weakening of domestic demand.
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the major determinants of GDP
growth in South Korea using quarterly time series data that focuses upon the
contribution of investment, trade and human capital, covering the period 1980Q1 to
2005Q3. First, the time series properties of the data are analyzed using the ZivotAndrews (1992) model. The empirical results derived indicate that there is insufficient
evidence against the null hypothesis of unit roots for all of the variables under
investigation. Second, the Gregory-Hansen (1996) cointegration technique, allowing
for the presence of potential structural breaks in the data, is applied, and is found to
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship in favour of the existence of
at least one cointegration relation in the presence of single structural breaks in the
system. By applying these methodologies we find that most of the endogenously
determined structural breaks coincide with the gradual effects of the Asian crisis on
the Korean economy.
Taking into account the resulting endogenously determined structural breaks the error
correction version of the ARDL procedure is then employed, to specify the short- and
long-term determinants of economic growth in the presence of structural breaks.
Based on the preliminary empirical findings obtained we conclude that, in the longterm, policies aimed at promoting various types of physical and human capital, and
trade openness, have improved Korea’s economic growth.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 conducts an
overview of Korea’s GDP growth, investment trends, trade development and policies,
human capital development and the impact of the Asian financial crisis; section 3
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conducts an empirical analysis of the time series properties of the macroeconomic
data for the Korean economy, by applying the Zivot and Andrews unit root test and
the Gregory and Hansen cointegration test in the presence of potential structural
breaks; section 4 applies the ARDL procedure to test for the determinants of growth
in the presence of structural breaks; finally, section 5 presents a summary of the key
conclusions from this paper.
2. An overview of Korea’s economic growth
This section provides the context for our empirical analysis presented in sections 3, 4
and 5 of the paper. In doing so Korea’s period of rapid economic growth and
development is broken down into two sub-periods – the 1960s and 1970s, and, of
particular interest in the context of this paper, the period from 1980 to the present.
The period of the 1960s and 1970s
Following the Korean War (1950–1953), South Korea was one of the poorest
countries in the world. During 1953–1961 the economy experienced a slow economic
recovery and remained heavily dependent upon assistance from the USA, and its
economic development focused on an import substitution policy with considerable
investment in education. While the emphasis on import substitution was a mistake,
private and public investment in education would later provide a well-educated labour
force that would form the backbone of the labour intensive industries developed from
the early 1960s. Even in 1960, after the war damage had been repaired, Korea’s per
capita income was only US$79 in current prices, much lower than its neighbouring
countries.
The establishment of a growth and development strategy (1962-71) resulted in a
remarkable transformation of the economy that catapulted Korea to the status of
Newly Industrialising Country (NIC) by 1970. This period was characterized by
economic reforms emphasizing labour intensive light manufacturing exporting
industries (see Harvie and Lee, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1996; Ranis, 1971; Smith, 2000;
Song, 1990). Export targets were agreed between government and individual firms,
with emphasis placed on the development of firms best able to expand export capacity
and acquire and utilize technology. Government owned banks facilitated this process
through their preferential allocation of credit to such firms. Consequently, from the
early days of economic development, a relationship based system developed among
firms, their banks and the government (Smith, 2000).
This development strategy proved to be highly successful. The average annual growth
rate was 8.8 per cent during 1962-1971, double that prior to 1962. Per capita income
increased from US$82 in 1961 to US$286 in 1971. The industrial structure of the
country changed dramatically, with the share of manufacturing increasing from 12 per
cent to 20 per cent of GDP over the same period. Exports increased rapidly from
US$41 million in 1961 to US$1,133 million in 1971 (a 28 fold increase), representing
an average annual growth rate of 39 per cent. The strategy increased domestic savings
and employment, and enabled the economy to benefit from economies of scale in
production and technology transfer.

2

Despite these impressive outcomes the development strategy changed from the early
1970s, arising from a number of adverse side effects from the export driven growth
(see Harvie and Lee, 2003a, 2003b). First, it contributed to a sectoral imbalance
between the light and heavy industry sectors. Second, the export orientated
industrialization program widened the gap between those engaged in export business
and those in domestic business. Finally, by the early 1970s light industry exports
began to weaken, highlighting the need to develop new exportable products.
Consequently, in May 1973, Korea shifted from general export promotion and
incentives to the targeting of strategic HCIs (steel, heavy machinery, automobiles,
industrial electronics, shipbuilding, non ferrous metals and petrochemicals). Industry
neutral incentives for exports were replaced by industry specific and, in some cases,
firm specific measures involving generous government assistance (Smith, 2000). The
main tool of promotion was, again, preferential access to credit from government
owned banks, funded predominantly by external bank borrowing that resulted in a
rapid rise in foreign debt. Other HCI incentives included subsidies, tax reductions and
exemptions (Rhee, 1994). Without such government incentives large companies
would not have been willing to bear the risk and cost of such extensive investment in
these industries.
The HCI promotion strategy (1972-79) resulted in a number of economic problems:
rapid monetary expansion and increased budget deficits, investments were made
without sufficient analysis of their viability and impact on the overall economy, and
there were many overlapping investments, the focus on strategic industries resulted in
enormous economic inefficiency, the socialization of bankruptcy risk, combined with
the low interest rate ceilings, contributed to moral hazard in the banking and corporate
sectors, that encouraged, for firms in targeted sectors, excessively high levels of debt
and an emphasis on market share rather than profitability and shareholder value (Huh
and Kim, 1994). The HCI drive gave a major boost to the growth of the chaebol,
which radically transformed the industrial structure and market concentration (OECD,
1994, p.60).
The economy showed signs of overheating during 1976-78, accompanied by a rapid
increase in wages that surpassed the growth of labour productivity. This was
exacerbated further by the Middle East construction boom in 1976 and its impact on
domestic land prices. These caused one of the country’s worst bouts of inflation that
resulted in weakened export competitiveness, and slowed export and overall economic
growth.
Overall, the period of the 1960s and 1970s was one characterised by a number of
favourable developments that were conducive to the rapid development of the
economy: the normalization of relations with Japan in 1965, fiscal and financial
reforms in the mid-1960s aimed at maintaining stabilisation of the economy,
supplying materials for the Vietnam War, the Middle East construction boom in the
1970s, and the relatively free trade environment, based on the GATT system, that
enabled Korea to gain access to export markets such as the US while being able to
maintain a relatively protected domestic market. Korea also maintained its rapid
growth during the 1970s despite the two oil crises during this period.
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The period from 1980
A summary of developments in selected economic indicators is contained in Figures
1-6. These are now briefly discussed.
As indicated in Figures 1 and 2 GDP and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)
growth were both highly volatile during the period of the 1980s, 1990s and early
2000s, but a cursory look suggests a distinct break between the pre and post financial
and economic crisis of 1997/1998. In the pre crisis era GDP growth fluctuated around
8 per cent per annum, while in the post crisis era this dropped to around 6 per cent.
Over the entire period only in 1980 and 1998 did the country experience negative
economic growth. Against a backdrop of: the second oil price crisis; a bad agricultural
harvest; and a domestic political crisis with the assassination of President Park in
October 1979, the first negative rate of GDP growth since the emergence of Park’s
regime (1961-79) emerged in 1980. HCI investment and a global and domestic
economic downturn combined to leave many of the heavily targeted industries of the
1970s with severe over-capacity problems in the early 1980s. GFCF growth
consequently remained weak in 1980 and 1981, thereafter experiencing distinct cycles
in terms of growth and decline (1982-1985, 1985-92, 1992-1998, 1999-2004). The
post crisis recovery in GFCF has been, by previous standards, much weaker and short
lived.
The period of the 1980s and 1990s experienced major shifts in economy policy in
comparison to that of earlier periods. Against a background of weakening economic
performance in the early 1980s the new government focused policy upon economic
stabilization and liberalization (1980-89) emphasizing - trade liberalization, financial
liberalization, market opening, promotion of small and medium enterprises, antitrust
legislation, greater opening to foreign investment, preferences for specific industries
to be reduced, and structural change toward the development of more technology
based industries (Smith, 2000). By the mid 1980s the economic stabilization measures
had achieved their desired objectives, as inflation decreased and the economy
recovered its competitiveness, productivity, output (Figure 1) and investment (Figure
2) growth. From 1986 to 1989 economic conditions were given a further boost by
favourable external conditions from the three lows – low oil price, weak US dollar,
and low global interest rates. In 1986, for the first time in Korea’s modern history, the
nation’s current account shifted into the black, where it remained until 1990, the
balance of payments was in sizeable surplus, exports exceeded imports and domestic
savings exceeded domestic investment for the first time since the First Five Year Plan
(Harvie and Lee, 2003b). The economy registered a high annual growth rate of 12 per
cent. Industrial restructuring also made headway with the share of the manufacturing
sector in total GNP rising from 29.7 per cent in 1980 to 32.3 per cent by 1987. By late
1988, however, a presidential election, the Olympic games, abnormally high wages
and incomes growth, steeply rising land prices, and ongoing structural problems in the
economy combined to severely jolt economic stability and economic growth slowed
to 8 per cent in 1989 (Lee, 1996).
Much of the 1990s witnessed increased economic opening and the onset of financial
crisis (1990-97). Increased integration into the global economy through further
external trade and financial liberalization represented a natural extension to the
liberalization measures adopted during the 1980s. However, the seeds of the financial
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crisis that were to hit in late 1997, and already planted during earlier periods, were
further exacerbated by developments and measures implemented during 1990-97.
Economic growth remained strong during this period with the exception of an
economic slow down in 1992-93 (see Figure 1) arising from a significant slowdown in
investment expenditure (see Figure 2), as well as decline in consumption expenditure,
as part of a stabilization policy to reduce inflationary pressure during 1990-91.
However, the benign macroeconomic environment of the 1990s, characterized by:
high GDP and export growth until 1996; low inflation; fiscal surpluses in general;
high savings and investment; low unemployment; and, until 1996, modest trade and
current account imbalances, hid growing financial weaknesses in the heavily indebted
and weakly profitable corporate sector, reflecting the tendency of business
conglomerates to diversify into capital-intensive industries, and the financial sector’s
unprecedented accumulation of short term debt (Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, (1999); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998; Economist (The),
1998; Kwon, 1998; Lee, 1999a and 1999b; Min, 1998; Park, 1998; and Radelet and
Sachs, 1998a and 1998b). The latter increasingly exposed the country to financial
turbulence in global and regional markets. This process was driven by the financial
liberalization of the early 1990s as an already fragile domestic financial system, a
legacy from earlier periods, encumbered by moral hazard, poor supervision and
regulation, heavy government intervention, poor accounting standards and lack of
transparency and underdeveloped capital markets, contributed to a significant increase
in short term capital flows (mainly in the form of debt and high relative to foreign
exchange reserves)1.
Such fragilities were of little concern, however, in an environment of rapid growth of
exports and output. With the deterioration of the country’s terms of trade and resulting
growth slowdown in export values in 1996 and 1997, however, the highly overleveraged corporate sector came under intense profitability and cash flow pressures.
In 1997 a number of chaebol became insolvent or had to seek protection from
creditors. An already shaky financial sector, arising from imprudent and excessive
lending to the chaebol, experienced a further sharp deterioration in non-performing
loans. Government action to tackle this problem was lacking. By October 1997 further
pressure began to be strongly applied by international investors on the currency as
concerns over the third major fragility, excessive short term foreign debt, came in to
play. The ability of the country to meet its short-term interest and debt repayments
was questioned as useable foreign exchange reserves diminished alarmingly. The
consequence was the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98.
After the 1997 financial crisis, and economic collapse of 1998, Korea made
remarkable advances, underpinned by financial and corporate sector reform and
restructuring (1998-present), achieving an average annual growth rate of 6 per cent
over the period 2000-04 and enabling it to be one of Asia’s few expanding economies.
Despite this, turbulence within the economy from domestic and external sources
remained. In 2001 a slowing global economy and falling exports due to the ‘tech
wreck’, reduced global demand for IT products, and falling semi-conductor prices,
accounted for reduced economic growth. The credit card bubble of 2001 and 2002
1

Korea’s short term foreign debt was high relative to its international reserves, a consequence of its
decision to liberalize short term borrowing rather than direct investment inflows (Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)).
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contributed to strong domestic demand but this was reversed in late 2002, as
households reduced consumption following a period of rapid accumulation of debt
and in 2003 the economy, once again, entered an economic downturn. Despite weak
domestic demand the acceleration of real export growth in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure
4), to a historical high of 20 per cent, supported output growth of 4.6 per cent in 2004.
Exports slowed significantly in the first half of 2005, due in part to weaker demand
from China which has become an increasingly important trading partner.
Key contributory factors to the country’s economic performance from 1998-present
have been: reform progress in areas of weakness exposed by the financial crisis,
market opening to international competition, strength in key sectors of the economy,
particularly in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, and
strong external demand particularly from China which has emerged as its biggest
trading partner. The country’s economic performance is also underpinned by
significant inputs of labour (see Figure 3) and capital, reflecting still-rapid population
growth, rising labour force participation rates and a high level of investment. Nearly
half of the major business groups (the chaebol) have disappeared, while foreign
ownership of listed companies has increased from 15 per cent to 42 per cent. Rising
foreign direct investment includes an important foreign presence in the banking
sector.
According to the OECD (2005) a number of outstanding issues essential to the
maintenance of the economy’s performance remain: maintaining macroeconomic
stability and sound public finances, the need to upgrade the innovation system to
promote faster productivity gains by improving the R&D framework (as indicated in
Figure 6, R&D expenditure has remained at between 1.8-2.6 per cent of GDP over the
1988-2003 period), improving labour productivity which stands at around one-half of
the OECD average, strengthening product market competition, restructuring tertiary
education to enhance human capital (see Figure 5), enhancing labour market
flexibility, further improving corporate governance, increasing efficiency in the
corporate sector, ensuring better supervision of the financial sector and reducing the
legacy of extensive government intervention in the economy, upgrading competition
policy and continuing the process of opening up to international trade and foreign
direct investment.
The issue of improving human capital, traditionally viewed as a key source for the
country’s rapid growth during the era of industrialization (Harvie and Lee, 2003a,
pp.205-206), is increasingly being recognized as key to the country’s future growth
and prosperity. There are encouraging signs that human capital is improving,
particularly the proportion of those employed with college/university qualifications
(see Figure 5). Despite this there is criticism of the Korean educational system, with
its traditional focus on rote learning and insufficient emphasis on individual thinking
and creativity. These dimensions will be of considerable importance in the ‘new
economy’ with its emphasis on knowledge and skill intensive activities, and the
ability to commercialize new ideas and knowledge.
In the context of this brief overview of the Korean economy the following three
sections of the paper report empirical results for key variables emphasized in this
section – real GDP, real gross fixed capital formation, employment, human capital (as
proxied by expenditure on education by households), real exports and real imports.
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Figure 1
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
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Figure 2
Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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Figure 3
Employment
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Figure 4
Exports, Imports and the Trade balance
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Figure 5
High school graduates and college/university students
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Figure 6
R&D Expenditure
(% of GDP)
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Specifically, unit root tests are conducted for the variables of interest as well as tests
for structural breaks. A cointegration analysis of these variables in relation to
economic growth is also conducted to identify if they have been significantly related
to Korea’s economic growth over the period from 1980-2005.
Following endogenous growth theory, as well as recent empirical findings, factors
such as: physical capital (R&D effects), human capital or education (representing
knowledge spillover effects), export expansion (proxying positive externality effects),
and total imports (capturing learning-by-doing effects) are considered in order to
determine their effects on Korean economic growth. In the following sections the unit
root test based on the Zivot-Andrews(1992) model, which takes into account the
existence of potential breaks in the data, is explained and applied, then the results of
the Gregory-Hansen(1996) cointegration techniques in the presence of endogenously
determined breaks in the system will be presented, and, finally, an ARDL
methodology is employed to obtain the short-run and long-term determinants of
economic growth in Korea.
3.

Empirical analysis of the time series properties

This section of the paper conducts an empirical analysis of the time series properties
of the data to be employed in this study for the Korean economy, focusing upon that
outlined in the previous section, by applying the Zivot and Andrews unit root test and
the Gregory and Hansen cointegration test in the presence of potential structural
breaks.
Zivot and Andrews Unit Root Test with One Structural Break
Conventional tests for identifying the existence of unit roots in a data series include
that of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (1979, 1981) or Phillips-Perron. Recent
contributions to the literature, however, suggest that such tests may incorrectly
indicate the existence of a unit root, when in actual fact the series is stationary around
a one-time structural break (Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Pahlavani, et al, 2006). Zivot
and Andrews (ZA) (1992) argue that the results of the conventional unit root
hypothesis may be reversed by endogenously determining the time of structural
breaks. The ZA method runs a regression for every possible break date sequentially.
According to Harvie et al. (2006) the ZA model endogenizes one structural break in a
series (such as yt) as follows:
H0:

yt = μ + yt −1 + et

(1)

H1:
k

y t = μˆ + θˆ DU t (Tˆb ) + βˆ t + γˆ DTt (Tˆb ) + αˆ y t −1 + ∑ cˆ j Δ y t − j + eˆt

(2)

j =1

This model accommodates the possibility of a change in the intercept as well as a
broken trend. DUt is a sustained dummy variable capturing a shift in the intercept, and
DTt is another dummy variable representing a shift in the trend occurring at time TB.
The alternative hypothesis is that the series, yt, is I(0) with one structural break. TB is
the break date, and DUt=1 if t > TB, and zero otherwise, DTt is equal to (t-TB) if (t >
10

TB) and zero otherwise. The null is rejected if the α coefficient is statistically
significant.
More specifically, the ZA test asserts that TB is endogenously estimated by running
the above equation (2) sequentially in order to allow for TB to be in any particular
year with the exception of the first and last years. The optimal lag length is
determined on the basis of the Schwartz Information Criterion (SBC). Using the ZA
procedure the time of the structural changes (impacting on both the intercept and the
slope of each series) is detected based on the most significant t ratio for α̂ , that is tαˆ .
The results for the variables and data series utilized in this study using the ZA test are
presented in Table 1 and Figure 7. The results show that all the variables examined in
this study are non-stationary. The corresponding time of the structural break (TB) for
each variable is shown in the last column of Table 1. It can be observed that the one
time structural break for the variables Ln(GDP), Ln(GFCF), Ln(EMP), and
Ln(IMPORTS) occurred in the years 1997Q4 and 1998Q1, which covers the period in
which the Asian Financial crisis was at its most intense for Korea and before the rollover of short term debt had been agreed with international creditors. In addition, the
structural break for Ln(EDU) and Ln(EXPORTS) occurred in 1988Q4 and 1989Q1,
which are linked to the restoration of democracy in Korea in 1988 and the movement
toward increased integration into the global economy through further external trade
and financial liberalization from 1989/1990.
Table 1.
The Zivot-Andrews test results: break in both intercept and trend
k

Δyt = μ + β t + θ DU t + γ DTt + α yt −1 + ∑ ci Δyt − j + ε t
j =1

Variable
Description

Symbol

TB

K

tαˆ

Inference

Corresponding
break time

Asian Financial
Crisis
Real gross fixed capital
Asian Financial
LnGFCF
1998Q1 3
-3.72
Unit Root
formation
Crisis
Asian Financial
Employment
LnEMP
1998Q1 3
-3.32
Unit Root
Crisis
Expenditure on Education by
Restoration of
LnEDU
1988Q4 3
-3.85
Unit Root
households
democracy
Trade
Real exports
LnEXPORTS 1989Q1 3
-3.43
Unit Root
liberalization
Asian Financial
Real Imports
LnIMPORTS 1997Q4 3
-4.38
Unit Root
Crisis
Notes: (1) Critical Values at 1, 5 and 10% levels are -5.57, -5.08 and -4.82, respectively (Zivot and
Andrews, 1992). (2) Empirical results indicate that the corresponding null is rejected for all of the
variables under investigation. (3)
Sources: The data for these variables collected from The Bank of Korea (2005), and Korea
NationalStatistical Office: http://kosis.nso.go.kr.
Real GDP

LnGDP

1997Q4

11

3

-2.58

Unit Root

Figure 7.
Plots of the estimated timing of structural breaks by the ZA procedure
Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Tests for LNGFCF

Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Tests for LNGDP
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The Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Analysis with a Potential Structural Break
As noted by Perron (1989), ignoring the issue of potential structural breaks can render
invalid the statistical results not only of unit root tests but also of cointegration tests.
Kunitomo (1996) argues that in the presence of a structural change, traditional
cointegration tests, which do not allow for this, may produce ‘spurious cointegration’.
Therefore one has to be aware of the potential effects of structural breaks on the
results of a cointegration test, as they usually occur because of major policy changes
or external shocks in the economy. In this study considering the effects of potential
structural breaks is, therefore, very important, especially given that the Korean
12

economy has faced numerous structural breaks including the Asian financial crisis or
major changes in policy regime as identified in section 2 of the paper.
The Gregory-Hansen approach (1996) (hereafter, GH) addressed the problem of
estimating cointegration relationships in the presence of a potential structural break by
introducing a residual-based technique so as to test the null hypothesis (no
cointegration) against the alternative of cointegration in the presence of a break (such
as a regime shift). In this approach the break point (TB) is unknown, and is
determined by finding the minimum values for the ADF t statistic. Using the RATS
program the optimal number of lags can be selected automatically by general to
specific t-tests, AIC or SBC.
By taking into account the existence of a potential unknown and endogenously
determined one-time break in the system, GH introduced three alternative models.
The first model includes an intercept (or constant) (C) and a level shift dummy. This
model is illustrated as follows:2

x1t = μ1 + μ 2 DU t + α '1 x2t + et

(3)

In this case, the intercept dummy variable DUt takes the value of one after the break
date and zero otherwise.
The second alternative model (C/T), contains an intercept and trend with a level shift
dummy, and is shown as follows:

x1t = μ1 + μ 2 DU t + μ3t + α '1 x2t + et

(4)

The third model is the full break model (C/S), which includes two dummy variables,
one for the intercept and one for the slope, without including a trend in the model.
This model allows for change in both the intercept and slope as illustrated below:

x1t = μ1 + μ 2 DU t + α '1 x2t + α ' 2 x2t DU t + et

t=1,….,n

(5)

In the above equations DU t = 0 , if t ≤ [nτ ] and DU t = 1 if t > [nτ ] , where the
unknown parameter τ ∈ (0,1) is defined as the relative timing of the change point. The
cointegration slope coefficient before the regime shift is denoted by α1 and change in
the slope coefficient at the time of regime shift is denoted by α 2 . Finally, μ1
represents the intercept before the level shift, and the change in the intercept at the
time of the shift is represented by μ 2 .

This study only considers and applies the C/S model to Korean data, thereby allowing
for both changes in the intercept as well as change in the slope. The empirical result
based on the GH cointegration procedure (the C/S or ‘full break’ case), indicates that
the calculated statistic (-6.81)3 is smaller than its respective 5% critical value (-6.41)
reported in Gregory and Hansen (1996). This confirms the rejection of the null
2
3

The description here is based on Gregory and Hansen (1996).
See Figure 8
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hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of the existence of at least one cointegration
relationship in the presence of a structural break. The following graph shows that the
endogenously determined time of the break coincides with the effect of the Asian
financial crisis in 1997 and the subsequent economic crisis in 1998 and its aftermath
on the Korean economy.
Figure 8.
Plots of the GH Cointegration Test (Model C/S)
Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests
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Source: Author’ calculations based on the GH (1996) procedure (model C/S).

Thus, as Figure 8 clearly shows, the most important structural break in the Korean
economy, as identified endogenously by the GH procedure, took place in the first
quarter of 1999, which coincides with the gradual and cumulative effect of the Asian
financial and economic crisis and the subsequent impact of the policy response to this.
It should be noted that in the previous section we used the Zivot-Andrews unit root
test and determined the time of the break separately for each variable, while here the
time of the break has been determined for all the variables in the system.
4.

The ARDL Cointegration Approach

The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach is a new version of the
cointegration techniques for determining long-run relationships among study variables
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach is a more statistically significant
approach for determining cointegrating relationships in small samples, while the Johansen
cointegration techniques require larger samples for the results to be valid (Ghatak and
Siddiki, 2001; Pahlavani, 2005a). An advantage of the ARDL approach is that, while
other cointegration techniques require all of the regressors to be integrated of the same
order, it can be applied irrespective of their order of integration. It thus avoids the pretesting problems associated with standard cointegration tests (Pesaran et al., 2001).
In this study, by considering recent empirical methodologies in the context of
endogenous growth models and following Pahlavani (2005b), we assume that
economic growth is determined by endogenous factors such as physical capital (R&D
effects), human capital or education (representing knowledge spillover effects), export
expansion (proxying positive externality effects), and total imports (capturing

14

learning-by-doing effects). In other words, in this study, all of the key determinants
of economic growth have been considered by including physical and human capital,
imports and exports within a production function framework as follow:4
y = f(k, hc, x, m)

or

y= kα1. hcα2. xα3. mα4

This function implies that:
y = α1 ln k + α2 ln hc + αx ln x +αm ln m

(6)

Therefore the error correction representation of the ARDL model, by considering the
above variables, can be shown as follows:
Δ ln GDP = α +
0

n

n

n

j

j 1

j

n

+

n

c j Δ ln GFCFt − j + ∑ d j Δ ln ln EDUct − j + ∑ e j Δ ln EXPORTt − j
∑= b Δ ln GDPt− j + ∑
=0
=0
=0

f j Δ ln IMPORTt − j + δ
∑
j =0

1

j

j

ln GDPt −1 + δ 2 ln GFCFt −1 + δ 3 ln EDUct −1 + δ 4 ln EXPORTt −1 + δ 5 ln IMPORTt −1 + ε1t

The parameter δ i , where i=1,2,3,4,5 is the corresponding long-run multipliers, while
the parameters bj , c j , d j , e j , f j are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the underlying
ARDL model. To begin the empirical analysis one has to estimate the above equation
excluding the ECM term. This term is subsequently incorporated into the ARDL
model. One of the more important issues in applying ARDL is choosing the order of
the distributed lag function. The optimal number of lags for each of the variables is
shown as ARDL (4,4,1,0,4) and selected based on AIC. Table 3 shows the long-run
coefficients of the variables under investigation.
The empirical results in Table 3 reveal that in the long run physical investment,
human capital (education), trade openness and technological innovations will improve
economic growth in Korea. More specifically, in the long-run a one per cent increase
in physical capital leads to a 0.39 per cent increase in GDP. This indicates that
physical capital does have a substantial or statistically significant effect on the Korean
GDP growth performance. In fact, our empirical findings indicate that physical capital
is vital to economic growth in Korea. The empirical results show that a one per cent
increase in human capital (education) leads to a 0.23 per cent rise in GDP. In this
regard the efficiency of human capital can be further improved by more investment in
the education sector.
Similarly, a one per cent increase in total exports leads to a 0.37 per cent increase in
GDP. Korea’s rapid export oriented economic growth strategy is conducive to
economic growth. It is argued that the diversion of resources from the non-export
sector to the export sector can improve the overall productivity of the economy. In
addition, this favors the attainment of economies of scale and knowledge spillovers
and externalities due to the learning-by-doing effect.
The empirical results surprisingly show that increases in total imports led to decreased
GDP growth. Though this is theoretically unexpected, it is statistically significant.
4

For more explanation of the model specification used in the present study, see Pahlavani (2005b).
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This may be due to the fact that during the period of the 1960s and 1970s Korea
operated an import substitution policy emphasizing the importation of capital goods
that enhanced the technological capacity of the economy. However, since the 1980s,
and more importantly since 1990, the domestic economy has been rapidly opened up
to more imports. A larger proportion of these are likely to be in the form of consumer
goods to satisfy increased demand for such goods arising from the improved living
standards of the Korean people, implying that rising imports will add less to the
productive and growth capacity of the economy. It should be noted that in this study
we used aggregated imports data. Future research could usefully be undertaken using
import data disaggregated into intermediate and capital imports, an approach
recommended by endogenous growth theory as possibly yielding results useful for
even more effective policy analysis.
Table 3.
Estimated long-run coefficients and short-run error correction model (ECM)
ECM-ARDL: dependent variable: ΔLNGDP
The long-run coefficients results
ARDL (4,4,1,0,4) selected based on AIC
*************************************
Dependent variable is LNGDP

Regressor

ΔLNGDPt-1
ΔLNGDPt-2
ΔLNGDPt-3
ΔLNGFCFt
ΔLNGFCFt-1
ΔLNGFCFt-2
ΔLNGFCFt-3
ΔLNEDUt
ΔLNEXPORTt
ΔLNIMPORTt
ΔLNIMPORTt-1
ΔLNIMPORTt-2
ΔLNIMPORTt-3

100 observations used for estimation from
1980Q1 to 2004Q4
Regressor
LNGFCF
LNEDU
LNEXPORT
LNIMPORT
Intercept
D97Q4

Coefficient
0.39479
0.22979
0.37622
-0.37752
4.9479
-0.19289

t-Ratio[Prob]
4.4176[.000]
2.6579[.009]
5.8102[.000]
-2.7276[.008]
14.1987[.000]
-1.9989[.049]

Intercept
D97Q4
ECMt-1

Coefficient
-0.60961
-0.59412
-0.65904
0.26972
0.17446
0.15596
0.10541
0.01972
0.09545
-0.05671
0.10698
0.12879
0.12972
1.2554
-0.04894
-0.2537

t-Ratio[Prob]
-6.748[.000]
-7.434[.000]
-9.954[.000]
7.340[.000]
4.436 [.000]
4.062[.000]
2.638[.010]
1.067[.289]
3.565[.001]
-1.315[.192]
2.727[.008]
3.330[.001]
3.399[.001]
3.6819[.000]
-2.347[.021]
-3.246[.002]

R 2 = .99075 F (15, 84) 578.6364[.000]
Note: The AIC is used to select the optimum number of lags in the ARDL model.

After estimating the long-term coefficients we obtain the error correction
representation of the ARDL model. Empirical results show that this model passes all
the diagnostic tests, and supports the overall validity of the short-run model. Table 3
reports the short-run coefficient estimates obtained from the ECM version of the
ARDL model. The error correction term indicates the speed of adjustment to restoring
equilibrium in the dynamic model. The ECM coefficient shows how quickly/slowly
variables return to equilibrium, and it should have a statistically significant coefficient
with a negative sign. Bannerjee et al. (1998) holds that a highly significant error
correction term is further proof of the existence of a stable long-term relationship.
Table 3 shows that the expected negative sign of the ECM is highly significant. The
estimated coefficient of the ECMt-1 is equal to -0.2537, suggesting that deviation from
the long-term GDP path is corrected by around 0.25 percent over the following
quarter. This means that the adjustment takes place relatively quickly.
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5.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has reviewed Korea’s period of rapid economic growth and development
covering the period from the early 1960s to the present. This performance has been
impressive. Trends in a number of key macroeconomic variables were highlighted
including GDP growth, GFCF, exports, imports and the trade balance, education and
R&D expenditure.
The time series property of the data was analyzed by applying the Zivot-Andrews
(ZA, 1992) model to determine, endogenously, the most likely time of major
structural breaks in various macroeconomic variables for the Korean economy. After
accounting for the single most significant structural break the results from the ZA
model clearly indicate that, for all series under examination, the null hypothesis of at
least one unit root cannot be rejected. Empirical results indicate that for a majority of
the variables under investigation the endogenously determined break dates, based on
the above mentioned methodology, closely correspond to the Asian financial and
economic crisis of 1997-98.
The GH cointegration technique accommodates potential structural breaks, which
could potentially undermine the existence of a long-run relationship between GDP
growth and its main determinants. Empirical results based on this innovative
cointegration in the presence of a structural break show that there exists only one
cointegrating vector, therefore applying the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
procedure is the best way of determining long- run and short-run relationships.
Finally, the ECM version of the ARDL cointegration analysis was applied using as its
basis endogenous growth theory to identify the significance of key variables for the
growth of Korean real GDP. Empirical estimates indicate that, in the long-term,
policies aimed at promoting various types of physical investment, education spending
or human capital, trade openness and technological innovations will improve
economic growth. More specifically, the empirical results suggest that the growth of
GFCF, education spending and exports exerted a significant impact on GDP growth.
Only imports were found to be non significant, and this could be due to compositional
changes away from the importation of capital goods to consumer goods as Korean
standards of living have improved. It was also found that the speed of adjustment in
the estimated models is relatively high with 25 per cent of disequilibrium eliminated
within one quarter.
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